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1 Introduction
The economic effects of income inequality have been under intensive study within
the last two decades, the relationship between income inequality and economic
growth being the most studied subject (e.g. Barro 2000; Banerjee and Duflo 2003;
Castelló-Climent 2010; Forbes 2000; Galor and Moav 2004; Malinen 2012; Pers-
son and Tabellini 1994). After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the relation be-
tween inequality and financial stability has also become under scrutiny. Rajan
(2010) argues that rising inequality in developed economies caused redistribu-
tion in the form of subsidized housing finance, which led to a housing boom and
later to a crash with known consequences. Kumhof and Ranciére (2010) argue
that inequality raises leverage in middle-income and poor households as a result
of consumption smoothing. When the income concentrates on the high income
households, middle-income and poor households sustain their level of consump-
tion by borrowing against their future incomes. If there is no recovery in the real
incomes of the poor and middle income households, leverage among them will
keep on rising, which will eventually lead to loan defaults thus increasing the
probability of a financial crisis.
In a recent article, Bordo and Meissner (2013) set to test the hypothesis that
inequality increases leverage using data on top income shares and the ratio of bank
loans. They estimate the effect of change in income inequality on the change in the
ratio of bank loans and find "very little evidence linking credit booms and financial
crises to rising inequality". The result of Bordo and Meissner coincides with that
of Atkinson (2011) who finds that there seems to be an ambiguous causal relation
of income inequality on economic crises. However, as Atkinson points out, both
his and Bordo and Meissner’s result applies only to the relation between financial
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stability and changes in income inequality. Atkinson (2011, p. 35) concludes that
"we have not investigated whether inequality level was relatively higher before
identified macroeconomic shocks. Therefore, the level hypothesis cannot be ruled
out at this stage."
Atkinson (2011) refers to the hypothesis put forth by Stiglitz (2009) and for-
malized by Kumhof and Ranciére (2010), which states that during stagnating real
incomes, poorer households borrow to maintain their rising standard of living.
This creates a trending relation between income inequality and credit in the econ-
omy. As real income keeps on stagnating, credit acquired by lower income house-
holds keeps on growing and this trend eventually leads to defaults and to stress
among financial institutions. First differencing removes this trend and focuses
the analysis on the short term effects of inequality on credit. If the relationship
between inequality and credit is long-run, i.e. trending, in nature, using first differ-
enced variables may give biased information on the effect of inequality on lever-
age.
The analysis of this possible long-run relationship is complicated by the fact
that bank loans tend to grow over time, whereas the generally used measures of
income inequality, like the top 1% income share, are bounded from above. This
creates a problem, because it is not possible for something that is not trending to
have a long-run or an equilibrium relation with something that is upward trending,
in the first two moments at least. There are two ways around this problem: the
trending series can be detrended or it can be bounded using some suitable transfor-
mation. Detrending of the series is problematic, as it would remove the very thing
under interest, i.e. the trend. This makes "bounding" of the series a preferable
method, and there is a natural candidate by which the series can be transformed.
The top 1% income share, used by Bordo and Meissner (2013), measures the share
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of national income concentrated on the hands of the highest percentile of income
earners. As GDP is, in practice, the national income of a country, the share can
be presented as income of the top 1%GDP . Therefore, it would be natural to convert bank
loans the same way, i.e. bank loansGDP . This transformation would make the measures
comparable, as both would be expressed as a percentage of GDP, without remov-
ing the possible long-run relation that may exist between inequality and credit.
In the theoretical model by Kumhof and Ranciére (2010), leverage is modeled as
workers debt-to-income ratio. Thus, credit-to-GDP ratio is also a more accurate
statistical approximation of the measure of leverage used by Kumhof and Ranciére
than the level or the first difference of credit.
In this article, we test and estimate the relationship of income inequality and
credit as ratios to GDP. We use data on the income share of top 1% income earners
and bank loans on eight developed economies. Results indicate that both the top
1% income share and the share of credit to real GDP follow an unit root process.
The two series are also found to be cointegrated of order one implying that there is
a long-run steady-state relation between them. The long-run elasticity of share of
bank loans with respect to income inequality is estimated with panel DSUR and it
is found to be positive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and
gives the results of panel unit root tests. Cointegration test and estimation results
are presented in section 3, and section 4 concludes.
2 Data and unit root tests
We use the top 1% income share of the population to proxy the income inequal-
ity as Bordo and Meissner (2013). Leigh (2007) has demonstrated that the top
1% income share series have a high correlation with other measures of income
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inequality, like the Gini index. The data on top income share is obtained from
the World Top Income Database (Atkinson et al. 2011). The data on bank loans,
real GDP per capita, investment as a share of GDP, short-term interest rates, and
broad money (M2) as a share of GDP is obtained from the dataset of Schularik
and Taylor (2012). The data on real GDP is taken from the Maddison dataset of
the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Leverage is modeled as a debt to real income ratio in the theoretical model
by Kumhof and Ranciére (2010). This ratio is also behind the level hypothesis
introduced by Stiglitz (2009), where stagnating real incomes cause middle-income
and poor households to borrow in nominal terms. Thus, to test the hypotheses by
Kumhof and Ranciere and Stiglitz we use bank loans to real GDP (RGDP) as our
dependent variable.
Due to limitations of the data on top 1% income share, we are able to construct
a balanced panel on eight countries. The baseline dataset spans from 1959 to 2008,
whereas the dataset including short-term interest rate spans from 1972 to 2008.
Figure 1 presents the time series of the mean of the share of credit to real GDP
and the mean of the top 1% income share in our data. Figure shows that during the
period of 1959-1980 the share of income of the top 1% decreased, but at the same
time the share of bank loans increased, although only marginally. After 1980 the
share of income earned by the top 1% and the share of bank loans to real GDP
grew at a very similar pace. This latter period gives some evidence in favor of the
level hypothesis. The best way to analyze the possible relation between the two
variable is to test are the different trend processes driven by the same factors.
The data on bank loans is extremely heterogeneous, as described by Schu-
larik and Taylor (2012). Credit, money and banking institutions differ profoundly
across countries and in some cases historical data on credit covers only commer-
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Figure 1. Means of the share of bank loans to real GDP and the top 1% income share. Sources:
Atkinson et al. (2011); Schularik and Taylor (2012)
cial banks. As Schularik and Taylor, we tackle the issue of heterogeneity by using
country-related constants. In addition, we log-linearize the share of bank loans to
real GDP to diminish the cross-sectional variation in the series.1 There are few
yearly observations missing from the top 1% income share data, which we replace
by averages of the values preceding and following the missing observation.
We start by testing the time series properties of the data. We use two sets of
panel unit root tests to test for the possible unit roots. The first two are the so
1As the ratio of credit to real GDP is a percent variable, the log-linearization is done by trans-
formation:
ln(x) = ln
(
1 + x
100
)
.
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called first-generation tests, by Im et al. (2003) (IPS) and the Fisher type ADF test
by Maddala and Wu (1999). These tests assume that there is no cross-sectional
correlation between the units of the panel. The second generation panel unit root
tests by Pesaran (2007) and Phillips and Sul (2003) allow for cross-sectional cor-
relation within the panel. A more detailed explanation on the used test is provided
in the Appendix I. Table 1 presents the results of panel unit root tests for the six
included variables. According to results presented in table 1, all panel unit root
Table 1: Panel unit root tests
variable IPS ADF PS Pesaran
ln(credit/RGDP) 2.973 12.875 9.101 5.370
(0.998) (0.682) (0.999) (0.999)
top 1% 3.075 3.631 8.470 -3.891
(0.999) (0.997) (0.863) (<.001)
investments/GDP -3.077 36.646 14.978 -1.792
(0.001) (0.002) (0.380) (0.037)
M2/GDP 3.543 8.127 25.954 -0.629
(0.999) (0.945) (0.026) (0.265)
ln(real GDP per capita) -1.947 27.268 11.772 -0.833
(0.0258) (0.0386) (0.625) (0.203)
short term interest rate* -2.880 34.090 40.484 -.866
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
In unit root tests, the tested equation is: 4yit = ρiyi,t−1 + δi + ηit+ θt + it. The p-values of the test
statistics are presented in parentheses. All other test are done with the eight country panel ranging
from 1959 to 2008, except tests for short term interest rates are done with a panel with yearly
observations from 1972 to 2008.
tests find the share of credit to real GDP to be an unit root process, i.e. tests cannot
reject the null hypothesis of unit root. Three out of four panel unit root tests find
the top 1% income share and the share of broad money to GDP to be unit root
processes. Two out of the four tests find the real GDP per capita to be an unit
root process and one out of the four tests find the share of investments to GDP
to be an unit root process. According to all tests, the short-term interest rate is a
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trend-stationary process.2
3 Cointegration test and estimations
3.1 Panel cointegration testing
According to unit root tests presented in table 1, stochastic trends would drive the
time series of the top 1% income share and the share of credit to real GDP. Next
we test if the stochastic trends are linear combinations of one and another, i.e. we
test are the series cointegrated. To this end, we use two panel cointegration tests,
where the first one is the cointegration test by Pedroni (2004) and the second is the
cointegration test by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) (from now on BC).
The biggest difference between these tests is that while Pedroni’s test assumes
uncorrelated residual structure, BC’s test allows for cross-sectional correlation
through common factors and it also controls for possible structural breaks in the
cointegration relation. Appendix III gives more detailed description of the used
tests.
The model for testing for cointegration between inequality and credit is:
ln(credit/RGDP)it = αi +γitop1%it + it, (1)
where the level of bank loans are explained by the level of inequality, and (1,−γi)
is the country-specific cointegration vector between bank loans and the top 1%
income share. We include individual constants due to heterogeneity of the data on
bank loans discussed in the previous section. Results of panel cointegration tests
based on the model (1) are presented in table 2.3 15 out of the 19 test statistics
2According to all second generation panel unit root tests, the first-differences of log of credit
to real GDP, top 1% income share, investments to GDP, money to GDP and GDP per capita are
trend-stationary. Results are available upon request.
3The Pedroni’s test was conducted with Eviews 6 and B&C’s test was done with Gauss. We
are grateful to Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing the program code.
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Table 2: Panel cointegration test statistics for ln(credit/RGDP) and top 1% income
share
Pedroni tests
Within-dimension Constants Constants
panel v-statistic -2.285 -1.835
(0.029) (0.074)
panel ρ-statistic 2.274 2.264
(0.030) (0.031)
panel PP-statistic 3.070 2.948
(0.004) (0.005)
panel ADF-statistic 3.205 2.786
(0.002) (0.008)
Between-dimension Constants
group ρ-statistic 2.999
(0.004)
group PP-statistic 3.861
(<.001)
group ADF-statistic 3.777
(<.001)
BC tests
Constants Trends
ZtˆNT (λˆ) 0.864 -1.302
(0.801) (0.096)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -3.354 -6.026
(<.001) (<.001)
Constants, level shift Constants, ci. vector shift
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -0.988 -2.451
(0.162) (0.007)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -5.543 -11.55
(<.001) (<.001)
The null hypothesis is that the variables are not cointegrated. In the test by Pedroni, lag length
were determined with Schwarz information criterion. Constants states that individual constants
were used in the test, and trends that individual constants and trends were used in the test. Tests
with level and cointegration vector shifts allow for structural breaks to occur in the country-specific
cointegration relations.
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presented in table 2 find that the series of top 1% income share and credit to real
GDP are cointegrated of order one at the 5% level. Moreover, 13 out of the 15 test
statistics that do not allow for level of cointegration vector shifts find the top 1%
income share and share of credit to real GDP to be cointegrated at the 5% level.
Therefore, we conclude that top 1% income share and credit to real GDP seem to
be cointegrated, i.e. that the two series have a long-run steady-state relation.
3.2 Estimations
First differencing of cointegrated variables removes stochastic trends and it elimi-
nates the long-run dependency between the variables. What remains is a short-run
relation, which may or may not exist. However, following previous literature, we
first estimate variables in first differences. More precisely, we estimate a model:
∆ln(credit/RGDP)it = αi +β1∆topi,t−1 +β2∆investments/GDPi,t−1+ (2)
+β3∆M2/GDPi,t−1 ++β4∆ln(RGDPi,t−1 +β5∆stiri,t−1 +uit,
where αi are individual constants and uit is the idiosyncratic error term. Explana-
tory variables are lagged with one period to control for the possible endogeneity
of regressors.
Table 3 presents the results. Results of table 3 indicate that income inequality
would not have statistically significant short-run effect on nominal credit. In the
last estimation, none of the parameter estimates of the explanatory variables is
statistically significant at the 5% level.
The picture somewhat changes when the levels of credit to real GDP and top
1% income share are used. We use panel DSUR (dynamic seemingly unrelated re-
gressions) estimator by Mark et al. (2005) to estimate the cointegration coefficient
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Table 3: Regression results using first differenced variables
Dependent variable: ∆ln(credit/RGDP)
FE-OLS FE-OLS
∆top 1t−1 -0.0002 -0.0019
(0.0028) (0.0029)
∆ln(real GDP per capita)t−1 -0.0022 0.1611
(0.0693) (0.1105)
∆investments/GDPt−1 0.4223** 0.3944
(0.1504) (0.2479)
∆M2/GDP t−1 0.0652* 0.0255
(0.0292) (0.0253)
∆short term interest ratet−1 - 0.0799
(0.1332)
countries 8 8
years 1959-2008 1972-2008
observations 384 280
Estimations are done with country fixed-effects. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are presented in parentheses.
of top 1% income share using a model:
ln(credit/RGDP)it = αi +γ′1top1it +βpXit + θt +uit, (3)
where αi are individual constant, θt is the common time effect, (1,−γ′1) is the coin-
tegrating vector between bank loans and top 1% income share, Xit is the matrix
of additional explanatory variables, and uit is the idiosyncratic error. As the panel
DSUR does not allow for cointegration between explanatory variables, all the
other explanatory variables, besides top 1% income and short term interest rates,
are differenced.4 The panel DSUR estimator controls for the possible endogeneity
of explanatory variables by including the leads and lags of the first differences of
the explanatory variables in the estimated equation. More information about the
panel DSUR can be found in the Appendix III.
4There is no need to take the first difference of the short term interest rate, as all the panel unit
root tests presented in table 1 found the series to be trend-stationary.
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Table 4 presents the results panel DSUR estimations on equation (3) using the
dataset spanning from 1959 to 2008.5 First differences of the GDP per capita and
shares of M2 and investment to GDP are included as additional explanatory vari-
ables. According to the results presented in table 4, the cointegration coefficient
Table 4: DSUR estimates, 1959-2008
Dependent variable: ln(credit/RGDP)
top 1% 0.051*** 0.073*** 0.017***
(0.0037) (0.0050) (0.0026)
∆ln(real GDP per capita) - -0.012* 0.071
(0.0050) (0.0499)
∆money/GDP - - -0.003
(0.0259)
∆investment/GDP - - -0.075
(0.1218)
countries 8 8 8
years 1959-2008 1959-2008 1960-2008
observations 400 400 392
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All DSUR
estimations include individual constants and common time effects. First and second leads and lags
of the first differences are used as instruments for the explanatory variables.
of top 1% income share is positive and highly statistically significant. The value
of the cointegrating coefficient varies from around 0.05 to around 0.07. In the
last estimation none of the parameter estimates of the first differenced explanatory
variables are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 5 presents the results of panel DSUR estimations on equation 3 using
the dataset spanning from 1972 to 2008. In addition to first differences of the
GDP per capita, M2 to GDP and investment share to GDP, short-term interest
rate in levels is included as an explanatory variable.6 According to the results of
5DSUR estimations were done with Gauss. We are grateful to Donggyu Sul for providing the
program code on his homepage.
6DSUR estimations were done with Gauss. We are grateful to Donggyu Sul for providing the
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Table 5: DSUR estimates, 1972-2008
Dependent variable: ln(credit/RGDP)
top 1% 0.0558*** 0.0563*** 0.0054*** 0.019***
(0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.00573)
∆ln(real GDP per capita) - -0.649 -0.0381 0.0153
(0.3511) (0.0532) (0.1297)
∆money/GDP - - -0.123*** -0.1023
(0.0345) (0.0663)
∆investment/GDP - - 0.0245 -0.112*
(0.0914) (0.0396)
short term interest rate - - - -0.152***
(0.0329)
countries 8 8 8 8
years 1972-2008 1972-2008 1972-2008 1972-2008
observations 296 296 296 296
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All DSUR
estimations include individual constants and common time effects. First and second leads and lags
of the first differences are used as instruments for the explanatory variables.
table 5, the cointegrating coefficient of top 1% income share is positive and highly
statistically significant. The first differences of money share to GDP and the short-
term interest rate have statistically significant negative parameter estimates. The
negative effect of short-term interest rate to ratio of bank loans to real GDP is
expected, as higher interest rates make borrowing more expensive. The negative
parameter estimate of the share of M2 to GDP, on the other hand, is likely to result
from reverse causality. That is, as bank loans increase, money held in deposit
accounts (etc.) decreases, which will decrease the broad money in circulation.
program code on his homepage.
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4 Conclusion
Income inequality is a trending variable. In the absence of wars or other major
catastrophes changes in inequality are gradual, manifesting during a course of
several years, even decades (Atkinson et al. 2011). Same applies to credit. The
share of credit to GDP has been gradually growing within the last fifty years or so.
Kumhof and Ranciére (2010) argue that there is a long-run relationship between
income inequality and share of credit to income, where income inequality will to
lead to increasing leverage in the economy.
In this study, we have tested the existence of such a long-run relationship. Ac-
cording to the results, there is a long-run steady-state relationship between income
inequality and leverage in developed economies. The long-run elasticity of lever-
age with respect to income inequality was found to be positive. This indicates
that income inequality increases leverage in the economy in accordance with the
theories by Kumhof and Ranciére (2010), Rajan (2010) and Stiglitz (2009).
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APPENDIX I: Panel unit root tests
All the used tests allow for individual unit root processes. That is, they allow
the coefficient of unit root to differ across countries.
The traditional panel unit root tests, are based on the following regression:
4yit = ρiyi,t−1 +ηit+αi + θt + it, (4)
where αi are individual constants, ηit are individual time trends, and θt are the
common time effects. The tests rely on the assumption that E[it js] = 0 ∀ t, s and
i , j, which is required for calculating common time effects. Thus, if the different
series are correlated, the last assumption is violated.
The second generation test are based on the regression
4yit = ρyi,t−1 +ηit+αi +δiθt + it, (5)
where αi are the individual constants, ηit are the individual time trends, and θt is
the common time effect, whose coefficients, δi, are assumed to be non-stochastic,
measure the impact of the common time effects of series i, and it is assumed to
be normally distributed with mean zero and covariance of σ2 and independent of
 js and θs for all i , j and s, t. Cross-sectional dependence is allowed through
the common time effect, which generates the correlation between cross-sectional
units. The matrix δi gives the non-random factor loading coefficients that deter-
mine the extent of the cross-sectional correlation.
The null hypothesis in all tests is that ρi = 0 ∀ i, i.e. that the process in I(1)
nonstationary. The alternative hypotheses are:
H1 : ρi < 0, i = 1,2, ...,N1, ρi = 0, i = N1 + 1,N1 + 2, ...,N. (6)
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For consistency of panel unit root tests it is also required that, under the alterna-
tive, the fraction of the individual processes that are stationary is non-zero, for-
mally limN→∞(N1/N) = γ, 0 < γ ≤ 1 (Im et al. 2003).
Appendix II: Panel cointegration tests
Panel cointegration test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011)
is based on the normalized bias and the pseudo t-ratio test statistics by Pedroni
(2004). The data generating process behind Pedroni’s test statistics is given by:
yit = fi(t) + x′it + eit,
4xit = vit,
eit = ρiei,t−1 + itζit = (it,vit)′,
(7)
where fi(t) includes member specific fixed effects and deterministic trends.
The data generating process is described as a partitioned vector z′it ≡ (yit, xit)
where the true process is generated as zit = zi,t−1 + ζit, ζ′it = (ζ
y
itζ
X
it ) (?).
1√
T
∑[Tr]
t=1 ζit
is assumed to converge to a vector Brownian motion with asymptotic covariance
of Ωi as T −→∞. The individual process is assumed to be i.i.d. so that E[ζitζ′js] = 0
∀s, t, i , j.
Let eˆit denote the estimated residuals of obtained from (7) and Ωˆi the consis-
tent estimator of Ωi. The two test statistics can now be defined as :
Z˜ρˆNT−1 ≡
N∑
i=1
 T∑
t=1
eˆ2i,t−1

−1 T∑
t=1
(eˆi,t−1∆eˆit − λˆi),
Z˜∗tˆNT ≡
N∑
i=1
 T∑
t=1
sˆ∗2i eˆ
∗2
i,t−1

−1/2 T∑
t=1
(eˆ∗i,t−1∆eˆ
∗
it),
where λˆi = 1/T
∑ki
s=1 (1− s/(ki + 1))
∑T
t=s+1 µˆitµˆi,t−s, σ˜
2
NT ≡ 1/N
∑N
i=1 Lˆ
−2
11iσˆ
2
i , sˆ
∗2
i ≡
1/t
∑T
t=1 µˆ
∗2
it , s˜
∗2
NT ≡ 1/N
∑N
i=1 sˆ
∗2
i , Lˆ
2
11i = 1/T
∑T
t=1 ϑˆ
2
it+2/T
∑ki
s=1 (1− s/(k− i+ 1))
∑T
t=s+1 ϑˆi, ϑˆi,t−s.
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The residuals µˆit, µˆ∗it and ϑˆit are attained from regressions: eˆit = γˆeˆi,t−1 + µˆit, eˆit =
γˆieˆi,t−1 +
∑K−i
k=1 γˆik∆eˆi,t−k + µˆ
∗
it, ∆yit =
∑M
m=1 bˆmi∆xmi,t = ϑˆit. (Pedroni 1999, 2004)
The statistics pool the between dimension of the panel and they are constructed
by computing the ratio of the corresponding conventional time series statistics
and then by computing the standardized sum of the N time series of the panel.
Pedroni (1999, 2004) shows that under the null of no cointegration the asymptotic
distributions of the two statistics presented above converge to normal distributions
with zero mean and variance of one as N and T sequentially converge to infinity.
Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2006) extend the model by Pedroni (2004)
to include common factors:
yi,t = fi(t) + x′i,t +ui,t,
4xi,t = vi,t,
fi(t) = µi +βit
uit = F′tpii + eit
(8)
where ei,t = ρiei,t + i,t and F′t :s are the common factors which are used to account
for the possible cross-sectional dependence.
APPENDIX III: Panel DSUR estimator
The data generation process in Mark et al. (2005) DSUR estimator is of the
form
yit = αi +λit+ θt +β′xit +uit, (9)
4xit = eit (10)
where there are n cointegrating regression each with T observations, (1− β′) is
the cointegration vector between yit and xit, and xit and eit are k× 1 dimensional
vectors. Panel DSUR eliminates the possible endogeneity between explanatory
variables and the dependent variable by assuming that uit is correlated at most
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with pi leads and lags of 4xit (Mark et al. 2005). The possible endogeneity can
be controlled by projecting uit onto these pi leads and lags:
uit =
pi∑
s=−pi
δ′i,s4xi,t−s +uit∗ = δ′izit +u∗it. (11)
The projection error u∗it is orthogonal to all leads and lags of 4xit and the estimated
equation becomes:
yit = αi +λit + θt +β′xit +δizit +u∗it, (12)
where δ′izit is a vector of projection dimensions. Panel DSUR estimates a long-
run covariance matrix that is used in estimation of equation (9). This makes
panel DSUR more efficient when cross-sections are dependent. The efficiency
of panel DSUR actually improves as the correlation between cross-sections in-
creases. Asymptotics properties of the estimator are based on T −→ ∞ with N
fixed.
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